Court Cases

In August 2025, President Trump removed Governor Lisa Cook from the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors based on his determination that he had cause to do so. Governor Cook sued, arguing that the President’s decision to remove her violated her due process rights and was ultra vires (in excess of) the authority Congress granted the President because it was not “for cause” as required by the Federal Reserve Act. After the lower courts granted Governor Cook’s request for an injunction to prevent her removal, the government filed an application in the Supreme Court to stay (pause) the injunction. The government made two arguments in its stay application in response to Governor Cook’s ultra vires claim: first, that President Trump’s decision to remove Governor Cook is unreviewable in court because the determination of cause is committed to the President’s unreviewable discretion, and second, that even if a court could review President Trump’s decision, Governor Cook would face a demanding standard—a “Hail Mary pass”—to win on her claim. Specifically, the government argued that to prevail on her ultra vires claim, Governor Cook would need to show that that the President’s action was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute, rather than simply that the President’s action was unauthorized by the statute. Together with the National ACLU and The Rutherford Institute, we filed an amicus brief in support of neither party to refute the government’s argument that such a demanding standard applies. We argue that the standard that the government proposes is a narrow exception to the default standard for ultra vires claims. Under the default standard, a plaintiff bringing an ultra vires claim is not required to show that a government official’s action was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute. Instead, the plaintiff only needs to show that the official’s action was unauthorized by law. This default standard is over a century old and well-established in the Supreme Court’s precedents. By contrast, the demanding standard the government proposes for ultra vires claims should apply only where Congress has limited judicial review. The standard courts apply to ultra vires claims is important because it can determine whether the party challenging unlawful executive action will win or lose its claim. Under the government’s position, any time a party alleges that a government official is acting without legal authority and there is no private right of action in a statute, the party would need to satisfy the heightened “Hail Mary” standard, making it highly unlikely it will win. Such a rule would undermine rule of law and separation of powers principles and improperly hamper courts’ ability to review executive action for compliance with federal law. We therefore urged the Supreme Court in our amicus brief to apply the heightened standard the government proposes to Governor Cook’s ultra vires claim only if the Federal Reserve Act limits judicial review. The Supreme Court is expected to hear oral argument in this case in January 2026.

Rene Quiñonez owns a small print shop in Oakland, California. In 2020, at the height of the pandemic and the summer of civil rights activism following the murder of George Floyd, he received his biggest order ever, for thousands of cloth masks printed with protest slogans (like "Stop Killing Black People"). But a postal clerk seized the shipment, harming Mr. Quiñonez's business. Mr. Quiñonez sued, alleging that the clerk had no legitimate reason to seize the masks and violated his constitutional rights in doing so. The district court threw the case out, ruling that Mr. Quiñonez had not met the strict standards for suing federal officers. This case implicates a problem bigger than one shipment of masks: whether people whose rights are violated by federal officers can sue to obtain redress. State and local officers who violate the Constitution could be sued for it, because there's a specific federal law saying so. Because Congress didn't pass a similar law for federal officers, the Supreme Court has made it extremely difficult to sue federal officers — regardless of the merits of the case. So even if the Constitution was clearly violated, if the wrongdoer was a fed, the victims usually cannot bring a constitutional claim against him. This rule creates a major gap in constitutional enforcement, especially here in D.C., where there is a huge federal law enforcement presence. Because of the Supreme Court's special hostility toward claims against federal officers, for instance, our case seeking damages for the massive, unprovoked assault on peaceful civil rights demonstrators at Lafayette Square in the summer of 2020 is proceeding on very different terms against the federal officers than against the local officers involved in the same incident: whereas we were able to certify a class action and will be able to seek punitive damages against the D.C. police, we could proceed only on behalf of a handful of individuals (not a class) against the U.S. Park Police, Secret Service, and other federal defendants like former Attorney General William Barr, and we cannot seek punitive damages. Mr. Quiñonez appealed the dismissal of his case. Together with the ACLU of Northern California, we filed an amicus brief supporting Mr. Quiñonez's appeal, on the issue of federal officer accountability. We explained how, separate from the path to accountability that the Supreme Court has shut off under federal law, state and local laws still permit suits against federal officers for constitutional violations. Rights without remedies are not worth very much. It is our goal to establish a clear path by which federal officers can be held accountable for violations of constitutional rights.

Immigrants have a right to legal representation in immigration proceedings, but do not have a right to government-appointed counsel. We filed this suit to challenge the failure to ensure compliance with constitutional requirements, federal law, and ICE’s own policies regarding access to counsel.

This brief argues that the Freedom of Information Act does authorize private lawsuits to enforce the publication provision, and that the courts do have authority to order agencies to comply with it.

On March 6, 2025, President Trump signed an Executive Order called “Addressing Risks from Perkins Coie LLP.” Perkins Coie is a major national law firm, headquartered in Seattle. The President declared that Perkins Coie engaged in “dishonest and dangerous activity,” had “manufactured” evidence in connection with the Clinton 2016 presidential campaign, had engaged in “a pattern” of “egregious activity” by challenging (and defending) election laws, and had “racially discriminated against” its employees and applicants by pursuing diversity an inclusivity. To “address” these “risks,” he suspended the security clearances for all firm employees, ordered all federal agencies to terminate any contracts with the law firm’s clients, and ordered firm employees to be denied access to federal buildings and meetings or other engagement with federal employees—measures that would have the effect of putting the firm out of business. Perkins Coie filed suit on March 11 and on March 12 obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining the government from enforcing most of the Executive Order. The case was then scheduled for a prompt determination on the merits. On April 2, we and the National ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of Perkins Coie’s motion for summary judgment and in opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss the case. We were joined by a cross-ideological group of other amici, including the Cato Institute, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, the Institute for Justice, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, the National Coalition Against Censorship, the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press, the Rutherford Institute, and the Society for the Rule of Law Institute. Our brief argues that the executive order unconstitutionally retaliates against Perkins Coie for its constitutionally protected advocacy, in violation of the First Amendment; that it violates the constitutional separation of powers and due process; and it violates clients’ rights to representation by the lawyers of their choice; and that it is fundamentally a frontal attack on the rule of law. The president has issued similar executive orders aimed at destroying other law firms with which he has grievances. Jenner & Block and WilmerHale have challenged the orders directed at them, and on April 11 we filed amicus briefs supporting them.