Court Cases
Featured Cases
Mar 04, 2026
Escobar Molina v. Dep’t of Homeland Security – Challenging Warrantless Immigration Arrests Without Probable Cause in D.C.
On September 25, 2025, four Washington, D.C. community members and the national immigration organization CASA sued the Trump administration to end its policy and practice of making immigration arrests in D.C. without a warrant and without probable cause. The plaintiffs are represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of the District of Columbia, American Civil Liberties Union, Amica Center for Immigrants’ Rights, CASA, National Immigration Project, the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and the law firm of Covington & Burling.
Since August, federal officers from multiple agencies have made hundreds of immigration arrests in the District. The officers frequently patrol and set up checkpoints in neighborhoods where a large number of immigrants live and stop and arrest people as they go about their daily lives.
The law typically requires an agent to have a warrant when arresting someone for an immigration violation. One exception to the warrant requirement is when the agent has probable cause both that a person is in the United States in violation of the law and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.
According to the lawsuit, the Trump administration has a policy and practice of making immigration arrests without a warrant and without an individualized determination of probable cause that the person is in the country unlawfully and that the person is a flight risk.
Each plaintiff in the case was arrested, detained, and released. The lawsuit was filed as a class action. The plaintiffs seek a court ruling to prevent the government from conducting such unlawful arrests against them and others in the future.
On October 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification and a motion for a preliminary injunction, to stay agency action, and for provisional class certification to ask the Court to order Defendants and their agents to stop making warrantless immigration arrests without probable cause for flight risk, as required by the Immigration and Nationality Act.
On November 19, 2025, the district court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs’ motions. On December 2, 2025, the district court denied without prejudice Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, to stay agency action, and for provisional class certification. It issued an order preliminarily enjoining the government from enforcing its policy or practice of making warrantless civil immigration arrests in D.C. without a pre-arrest individualized determination by the arresting agent of probable cause that the person being arrested is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. It also provisionally certified a class consisting of “[a]ll persons who, since August 11, 2025, have been or will be arrested in this District for alleged immigration violations without a warrant and without a pre-arrest, individualized assessment of probable cause that the person poses an escape risk” for purposes of the preliminary injunction. The court further ordered the government to document the facts supporting an arresting agent’s probable cause to believe a person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained and to periodically provide such documentation to Plaintiffs’ counsel.
On February 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the preliminary injunction, arguing that Defendants are not complying with the preliminary injunction based on the arrest records they produced for warrantless civil immigration arrests in D.C. after the district court’s December 2 order as well as recent public statements made by high-ranking DHS officials on the legal standard for arrests and an internal ICE memorandum that was issued on January 28. The relief Plaintiffs seek includes training for Defendants’ agents on the correct legal standard to apply when making warrantless civil immigration arrests and additional reporting requirements regarding warrantless civil immigration arrests in D.C. The district court has set argument on the motion for March 11 at 10:00AM.
Jan 12, 2026
Fell v. Trump (formerly Stainnak v. Trump) - Challenging Purge of DEI-Associated Federal Workers As Discriminatory and Retaliatory for Perceived Political Beliefs
Federal employees filed a complaint against the Trump administration for targeting workers, especially people of color, women, and non-binary workers, for participating in diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) activities, violating their First Amendment rights.
Oct 23, 2025
O’Hara v. Beck: Defending the Right To Protest the National Guard
In Star Wars, the Imperial March is the music that plays when Darth Vader and his storm troopers enter the scene. It’s also the soundtrack of Sam O’Hara’s protest against the National Guard’s presence in D.C.
National Guard troops arrived in the District after President Donald Trump deployed them to support local police—an act that Mr. O’Hara views as a violation of centuries-old norms against militarizing domestic law enforcement and a threat to individual freedom.
To highlight the surreal danger of the deployment, Mr. O’Hara began walking behind Guard members when he saw them in the community, playing The Imperial March on his phone, and recording. Most community members got the point of the protest, and so did several members of the Guard, who either smiled or laughed in response.
Ohio National Guard Sgt. Devon Beck, however, was not amused by the satire. He threatened to call MPD if Mr. O’Hara didn’t stop his protest. When Mr. O’Hara persisted, Sgt. Beck recruited MPD officers to the scene, and the officers proceeded to detain and handcuff Mr. O’Hara, ending his demonstration.
The First and Fourth Amendments (not to mention D.C. law) bar government officials from detaining people just because of their speech. Mr. O’Hara is suing to vindicate that principle.
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283 Court Cases
Dec 31, 2025
Damus v. Nielson - Challenging Trump Administration’s Unlawful Detention of Asylum Seekers
Dec 31, 2025
Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice; Jenner & Block LLP. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice; WilmerHale LLP v. Executive Office of the President; Susman Godfrey LLP v. Executive Office of the President – Opposing Trump’s Effort to Break the Rule of Law
Dec 05, 2025
M.A. v. Noem (Formerly M.A. v. Mayorkas) - Challenging Government's Attempts to Block Asylum Claims
We filed this lawsuit in June 2023 to challenge a Biden Administration regulation making it nearly impossible for people entering the United States through the southern border to seek asylum. We alleged that the regulation violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and is arbitrary and capricious, violating the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Dec 05, 2025
League of Women Voters Educ. Fund v. Trump (a.k.a. LULAC v. Exec. Office of the President) - Challenging Executive Order Requiring Voters To Show Citizenship Documents To Register
Nov 21, 2025
Withrow v. United States: Challenging Ban on Transgender and Intersex Federal Employees’ Ability To Use Bathroom That Accords with Their Gender Identity
Nov 13, 2025
Banks v. Hoffman - Advocating for Robust Protection Against Lawsuits Used to Chill Speech
A Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”) is a term for a legal action that is of little merit but is filed anyway for the purpose of stopping someone from engaging in (usually constitutionally protected) speech by burdening them with a costs of a lawsuit. In December of 2010, the D.C. Council passed, with our support, an Anti-SLAPP Act that provides a special procedure for people engaged in advocacy on public interest issues to have a court dismiss SLAPP suits quickly.
One of the provisions of the Anti-SLAPP Act limits the discovery (that is, court-ordered exchange of information among the parties in a lawsuit) that can occur when the Anti-SLAPP Act’s protections are invoked. This is because discovery can be costly and time-consuming, so that even speakers who should obtain dismissal of a SLAPP might be chilled from speaking in the first place if they knew they could be forced to undergo discovery before dismissal.
In this case, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that the discovery limitations of the Anti-SLAPP Act were invalid because they modified D.C. court procedures in a manner inconsistent with the D.C. Home Rule Act of 1973, by which Congress granted the District limited powers of self-government.
Together with many other public interest groups, we filed an amicus brief in support of reconsidering this decision, in the hope that the court will restore the discovery protections for speakers hit with SLAPPs.
For more information on Washington D.C.’s Anti-SLAPP Act, click on the following link: http://www.anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/
In January 2024, the court granted the petition for rehearing. In April 2024, we joined with other public interest groups once again to file an amicus brief on the merits discussing the importance of the Anti-SLAPP Act and its protections for public advocacy.
In November 2025, the en banc court unanimously upheld the Anti-SLAPP Act as consistent with the Home Rule Act, clearing the way for the Anti-SLAPP Act to play its intended role in protecting free speech.
Nov 12, 2025
Federal Education Association v. Trump – Protecting the Rule of Law and Separation of Powers by Urging the D.C. Circuit to Apply the Correct Standard for Claims That the Government is Acting Without Legal Authority
On March 27, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order excluding the Federal Education Association and other unions representing educators who work in schools operated by the Department of Defense Education Activity (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) from coverage under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (“FSLMRS”), which protects federal employees’ collective bargaining rights. The plaintiff unions sued and moved for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the Executive Order violates the First and Fifth Amendments and is ultra vires (in excess of) the President’s authority under the FSLMRS. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that they established a likelihood of success on the merits of their ultra vires claim.
The government appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. It contends that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed for three reasons: first, that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the FSLMRS requires Plaintiffs to submit their claims to the Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”); second, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claim because the FSLMRS commits exclusion decisions to the President’s unreviewable discretion; and third, that even if Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claim were reviewable, Plaintiffs would face a demanding standard—a “Hail Mary pass”—to win on their claim. Specifically, the government argues that to prevail on their ultra vires claim, Plaintiffs must show that the President’s decision to exclude Plaintiffs from the statute’s coverage was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute, rather than simply that the President’s action was unauthorized by the statute.
On November 12, 2025, we filed an amicus brief in support of Plaintiffs to refute the government’s argument that such a demanding standard applies categorically. We argue that the standard that the government proposes is a narrow exception to the default standard for ultra vires claims. Under the default standard, a plaintiff bringing an ultra vires claim is not required to show that a government official’s action was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute. Instead, the plaintiff only needs to show that the official’s action was unauthorized by law. This default standard is over a century old and well-established in the Supreme Court’s precedents and supported by the D.C. Circuit’s precedents. By contrast, the demanding standard the government proposes for ultra vires claims should apply only where Congress has limited judicial review.
The standard courts apply to ultra vires claims is important because it can determine whether the party challenging unlawful executive action will win or lose its claim. Under the government’s position, any time a party alleges that a government official is acting without legal authority and there is no private right of action in a statute, the party would need to satisfy the heightened “Hail Mary” standard, making it highly unlikely it will win. Such a rule would undermine rule of law and separation of powers principles and improperly hamper courts’ ability to review executive action for compliance with federal law. We therefore urged the D.C. Circuit in our amicus brief to apply the ordinary, default standard to Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claim if the FSLMRS does not limit judicial review of the President’s exclusion decision.
The D.C. Circuit is scheduled to hear oral argument in this case on December 15, 2025.
Oct 29, 2025
Trump v. Cook – Protecting the Rule of Law and Separation of Powers by Urging the Supreme Court to Apply the Correct Standard for Claims that the Government is Acting Without Legal Authority
In August 2025, President Trump removed Governor Lisa Cook from the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors based on his determination that he had cause to do so. Governor Cook sued, arguing that the President’s decision to remove her violated her due process rights and was ultra vires (in excess of) the authority Congress granted the President because it was not “for cause” as required by the Federal Reserve Act. After the lower courts granted Governor Cook’s request for an injunction to prevent her removal, the government filed an application in the Supreme Court to stay (pause) the injunction. The government made two arguments in its stay application in response to Governor Cook’s ultra vires claim: first, that President Trump’s decision to remove Governor Cook is unreviewable in court because the determination of cause is committed to the President’s unreviewable discretion, and second, that even if a court could review President Trump’s decision, Governor Cook would face a demanding standard—a “Hail Mary pass”—to win on her claim. Specifically, the government argued that to prevail on her ultra vires claim, Governor Cook would need to show that that the President’s action was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute, rather than simply that the President’s action was unauthorized by the statute.
Together with the National ACLU and The Rutherford Institute, we filed an amicus brief in support of neither party to refute the government’s argument that such a demanding standard applies. We argue that the standard that the government proposes is a narrow exception to the default standard for ultra vires claims. Under the default standard, a plaintiff bringing an ultra vires claim is not required to show that a government official’s action was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute. Instead, the plaintiff only needs to show that the official’s action was unauthorized by law. This default standard is over a century old and well-established in the Supreme Court’s precedents. By contrast, the demanding standard the government proposes for ultra vires claims should apply only where Congress has limited judicial review.
The standard courts apply to ultra vires claims is important because it can determine whether the party challenging unlawful executive action will win or lose its claim. Under the government’s position, any time a party alleges that a government official is acting without legal authority and there is no private right of action in a statute, the party would need to satisfy the heightened “Hail Mary” standard, making it highly unlikely it will win. Such a rule would undermine rule of law and separation of powers principles and improperly hamper courts’ ability to review executive action for compliance with federal law. We therefore urged the Supreme Court in our amicus brief to apply the heightened standard the government proposes to Governor Cook’s ultra vires claim only if the Federal Reserve Act limits judicial review.
The Supreme Court is expected to hear oral argument in this case in January 2026.
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