Court Cases

On March 27, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order excluding the Federal Education Association and other unions representing educators who work in schools operated by the Department of Defense Education Activity (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) from coverage under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (“FSLMRS”), which protects federal employees’ collective bargaining rights. The plaintiff unions sued and moved for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the Executive Order violates the First and Fifth Amendments and is ultra vires (in excess of) the President’s authority under the FSLMRS. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that they established a likelihood of success on the merits of their ultra vires claim. The government appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. It contends that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed for three reasons: first, that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the FSLMRS requires Plaintiffs to submit their claims to the Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”); second, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claim because the FSLMRS commits exclusion decisions to the President’s unreviewable discretion; and third, that even if Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claim were reviewable, Plaintiffs would face a demanding standard—a “Hail Mary pass”—to win on their claim. Specifically, the government argues that to prevail on their ultra vires claim, Plaintiffs must show that the President’s decision to exclude Plaintiffs from the statute’s coverage was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute, rather than simply that the President’s action was unauthorized by the statute. On November 12, 2025, we filed an amicus brief in support of Plaintiffs to refute the government’s argument that such a demanding standard applies categorically. We argue that the standard that the government proposes is a narrow exception to the default standard for ultra vires claims. Under the default standard, a plaintiff bringing an ultra vires claim is not required to show that a government official’s action was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute. Instead, the plaintiff only needs to show that the official’s action was unauthorized by law. This default standard is over a century old and well-established in the Supreme Court’s precedents and supported by the D.C. Circuit’s precedents. By contrast, the demanding standard the government proposes for ultra vires claims should apply only where Congress has limited judicial review. The standard courts apply to ultra vires claims is important because it can determine whether the party challenging unlawful executive action will win or lose its claim. Under the government’s position, any time a party alleges that a government official is acting without legal authority and there is no private right of action in a statute, the party would need to satisfy the heightened “Hail Mary” standard, making it highly unlikely it will win. Such a rule would undermine rule of law and separation of powers principles and improperly hamper courts’ ability to review executive action for compliance with federal law. We therefore urged the D.C. Circuit in our amicus brief to apply the ordinary, default standard to Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claim if the FSLMRS does not limit judicial review of the President’s exclusion decision. The D.C. Circuit is scheduled to hear oral argument in this case on December 15, 2025.

In August 2025, President Trump removed Governor Lisa Cook from the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors based on his determination that he had cause to do so. Governor Cook sued, arguing that the President’s decision to remove her violated her due process rights and was ultra vires (in excess of) the authority Congress granted the President because it was not “for cause” as required by the Federal Reserve Act. After the lower courts granted Governor Cook’s request for an injunction to prevent her removal, the government filed an application in the Supreme Court to stay (pause) the injunction. The government made two arguments in its stay application in response to Governor Cook’s ultra vires claim: first, that President Trump’s decision to remove Governor Cook is unreviewable in court because the determination of cause is committed to the President’s unreviewable discretion, and second, that even if a court could review President Trump’s decision, Governor Cook would face a demanding standard—a “Hail Mary pass”—to win on her claim. Specifically, the government argued that to prevail on her ultra vires claim, Governor Cook would need to show that that the President’s action was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute, rather than simply that the President’s action was unauthorized by the statute. Together with the National ACLU and The Rutherford Institute, we filed an amicus brief in support of neither party to refute the government’s argument that such a demanding standard applies. We argue that the standard that the government proposes is a narrow exception to the default standard for ultra vires claims. Under the default standard, a plaintiff bringing an ultra vires claim is not required to show that a government official’s action was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute. Instead, the plaintiff only needs to show that the official’s action was unauthorized by law. This default standard is over a century old and well-established in the Supreme Court’s precedents. By contrast, the demanding standard the government proposes for ultra vires claims should apply only where Congress has limited judicial review. The standard courts apply to ultra vires claims is important because it can determine whether the party challenging unlawful executive action will win or lose its claim. Under the government’s position, any time a party alleges that a government official is acting without legal authority and there is no private right of action in a statute, the party would need to satisfy the heightened “Hail Mary” standard, making it highly unlikely it will win. Such a rule would undermine rule of law and separation of powers principles and improperly hamper courts’ ability to review executive action for compliance with federal law. We therefore urged the Supreme Court in our amicus brief to apply the heightened standard the government proposes to Governor Cook’s ultra vires claim only if the Federal Reserve Act limits judicial review. The Supreme Court is expected to hear oral argument in this case in January 2026.

Rene Quiñonez owns a small print shop in Oakland, California. In 2020, at the height of the pandemic and the summer of civil rights activism following the murder of George Floyd, he received his biggest order ever, for thousands of cloth masks printed with protest slogans (like "Stop Killing Black People"). But a postal clerk seized the shipment, harming Mr. Quiñonez's business. Mr. Quiñonez sued, alleging that the clerk had no legitimate reason to seize the masks and violated his constitutional rights in doing so. The district court threw the case out, ruling that Mr. Quiñonez had not met the strict standards for suing federal officers. This case implicates a problem bigger than one shipment of masks: whether people whose rights are violated by federal officers can sue to obtain redress. State and local officers who violate the Constitution could be sued for it, because there's a specific federal law saying so. Because Congress didn't pass a similar law for federal officers, the Supreme Court has made it extremely difficult to sue federal officers — regardless of the merits of the case. So even if the Constitution was clearly violated, if the wrongdoer was a fed, the victims usually cannot bring a constitutional claim against him. This rule creates a major gap in constitutional enforcement, especially here in D.C., where there is a huge federal law enforcement presence. Because of the Supreme Court's special hostility toward claims against federal officers, for instance, our case seeking damages for the massive, unprovoked assault on peaceful civil rights demonstrators at Lafayette Square in the summer of 2020 is proceeding on very different terms against the federal officers than against the local officers involved in the same incident: whereas we were able to certify a class action and will be able to seek punitive damages against the D.C. police, we could proceed only on behalf of a handful of individuals (not a class) against the U.S. Park Police, Secret Service, and other federal defendants like former Attorney General William Barr, and we cannot seek punitive damages. Mr. Quiñonez appealed the dismissal of his case. Together with the ACLU of Northern California, we filed an amicus brief supporting Mr. Quiñonez's appeal, on the issue of federal officer accountability. We explained how, separate from the path to accountability that the Supreme Court has shut off under federal law, state and local laws still permit suits against federal officers for constitutional violations. Rights without remedies are not worth very much. It is our goal to establish a clear path by which federal officers can be held accountable for violations of constitutional rights.

On August 11, 2025, President Trump invoked a section of the Home Rule Act permitting him to demand services from the D.C. police for federal purposes, and began flooding the District with federal agents, D.C. National Guard, and National Guard from other states. With a month, the D.C. government sued Trump twice — first to block him from taking over the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department entirely (a suit that induced Trump to back down from that attempt) and then to challenge the deployment of the National Guard. The first case proceeded too quickly for us to file a brief. In the second (both are called District of Columbia v. Trump), we filed an amicus brief supporting the District's lawsuit. Together with our co-counsel Washington Lawyers Committee, and joined by a broad coalition of D.C. nonprofits devoted to serving D.C. residents and fighting for D.C. autonomy (Amica Center for Immigrant Rights, Bread for the City, Children’s Law Center, DC Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, Disability Rights DC, Legal Aid DC, School Justice Project, Tzedek DC, and Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless), we explained how this most recent attempt to impose on D.C. a law enforcement presence not democratically accountable to the people of D.C. is part of a long history, stretching back 200 years to the founding of the District and often tinged with implicit or explicit racism, of denying D.C. residents full self-governance. Although every other American city and state can take this basic element of representative democracy as a given, for D.C., it have been elusive and, even when obtained, only tenuously held. Setting loose American troops—locally unaccountable and not trained for domestic law enforcement—to police the streets of D.C. neighborhoods on the thin pretext of an “emergency,” is anathema to principles of democratic accountability and our longstanding norm of civilian, not military policing. Additionally, we explain how a locally unaccountable law enforcement presence is likely to be less trusted by the community and therefore less effective — thus showing that Trump's move will make D.C. less safe, not more. On November 20, 2025, the court held the deployment of the D.C. National Guard was unlawful in the absence of a request from the D.C. government because it is beyond the President's power under Title 49 of the D.C. Code, enacted by Congress. The court further held that the deployment of other states' National Guards to D.C. was not justified by the provision of federal law that the President invoked because it is limited to operations authorized by those states' laws. Accordingly, the court granted a preliminary injunction but stayed it for 21 days to enable the government to appeal.

On May 1, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order titled “Ending Taxpayer Subsidization of Biased Media,” which directs the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and federal agencies to terminate all direct and indirect funding to NPR and PBS in explicit retaliation for the broadcasting organizations’ editorial and journalistic choices, which the order characterizes as “biased” and “partisan.” NPR and PBS each filed lawsuits challenging the executive order. On June 20, we ACLU filed amicus briefs in both cases (together with the National ACLU and the ACLUs of Colorado and Minnesota, where some plaintiffs in the cases are located), supporting the NPR and PBS motions for summary judgment, and arguing that the executive order constitutes a flagrant violation of the First Amendment because it retaliates against both speakers solely for their constitutionally protected speech, including the words they choose to use in coverage and what stories they choose to highlight. The briefs also argue that the order unconstitutionally restricts federal funding, including funds appropriated for local public broadcasters throughout the country to use as they see fit, based on President Trump’s disapproval of NPR’s and PBS’ news coverage. The briefs warn that the executive order threatens the editorial independence of local public broadcasters nationwide, undermines the congressionally mandated purpose of the Public Broadcasting Act, and endangers essential infrastructure like the Public Radio Satellite System, which reaches 99 percent of the U.S. population and plays a critical role in national emergency communications. As of August 2025, there has been no ruling in either case.

In this case, a Republican congressman from Illinois sued to challenge a state ballot counting deadline. His case was dismissed for lack of "standing" — meaning a personal stake in the outcome that is a prerequisite to filing a case in federal court. The lower courts ruled that it wasn't enough that the plaintiff's campaign had to spend money to cope with the election rule that he was challenging. When the Supreme Court agreed to review the case, we saw an important opportunity. Although we vigorously disagree with the congressman's position on the merits, it's vitally important that courts remain open to plaintiffs challenging voting rules that may disadvantage them. We have represented the League of Women Voters in such cases, and the government always seeks to challenge their standing, making the same types of arguments that kicked the plaintiff out of court here. Together with the League of Women Voters, the National ACLU, the ACLU of Illinois, and the Rutherford Institute, we filed an amicus brief in July 2025 to urge the Supreme Court to hold to its previous rulings permitting plaintiffs to sue based on economic harms to their organization. As we summarize our point in the brief: "political actors, candidates, and civic organizations may have standing to challenge electoral laws and regulations that affect their activities, force them to divert resources, and thus cause them concrete and tangible harms." Preserving access to the federal courts is fundamental to the defense of civil liberties and civil rights, because courts cannot vindicate these rights if they lack the power to hear the case in the first place.

This brief argues that the Freedom of Information Act does authorize private lawsuits to enforce the publication provision, and that the courts do have authority to order agencies to comply with it.