National Association of the Deaf v. Trump (ASL Interpretation During White House Press Briefings) – Protecting the Rule of Law and Separation of Powers by Urging the D.C. Circuit to Apply the Correct Standard for Claims that the Government is Acting Without Legal Authority

For four years, the White House provided American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpretation for its press briefings. It stopped doing so, however, in January 2025 when President Trump returned to office. This excluded deaf Americans, including Plaintiffs Derrick Ford and members of the National Association of the Deaf, from access to the White House press briefings. Plaintiffs sued and moved for a preliminary injunction to order the government to resume providing ASL interpretation during press briefings, arguing that the government’s failure to do so discriminates against deaf Americans in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that it established a likelihood of success on the merits of its Rehabilitation Act claim.

The government appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. It contends that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed because, among other reasons, the court lacks power to enforce Section 504. Specifically, according to the government, Congress precluded judicial review of a Section 504 claim; and even if it didn’t, Plaintiffs should nonetheless lose because they do not satisfy the heightened standard for “ultra vires” claims—which the government describes as a “Hail Mary pass” and one that requires the agency to have acted contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute, rather than simply showing that the project is unauthorized by the relevant statutes.

On June 2, 2026, we filed an amicus brief in support of Plaintiffs to refute Defendants’ objections regarding the enforceability of Section 504. We first argue that federal courts have inherent equitable power to enforce Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act based on courts’ historical powers, recognized by the Supreme Court, to prevent the government from violating the law, and that nothing about the Rehabilitation Act suggests that Congress intended to foreclose judicial review of Plaintiffs’ Section 504 claim.

We also argue that a plaintiff bringing an ultra vires claim is not generally required to show that a government official’s action was contrary to a specific prohibition in a statute. Instead, the plaintiff only needs to show that the official’s action was unauthorized by law. This default standard is over a century old and well-established in the Supreme Court’s precedents and supported by the D.C. Circuit’s precedents. By contrast, the demanding standard the government proposes for ultra vires claims should apply only where Congress has limited judicial review. Because there is no statutory limitation on judicial review of Plaintiffs’ claim, the ordinary, default standard—rather than the heightened standard proposed by Defendants—applies.

Whether courts can enforce laws duly enacted by Congress even in the absence of a statutory cause of action and the standard courts apply to ultra vires claims are important issues because they can determine the Executive Branch’s ability to get away with violating the law and whether the party challenging unlawful executive action will win or lose its claim. Under the government’s position, any time a party alleges that a government official is acting without legal authority and there is no private right of action in a statute, the party would need to satisfy the heightened “Hail Mary” standard, making it highly unlikely it will win. Such a rule would undermine rule of law and separation of powers principles and improperly hamper courts’ ability to review executive action for compliance with federal law. We therefore urged the D.C. Circuit in our amicus brief to reject the government’s sweeping position and apply the ordinary, default standard to Plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act claim.

The D.C. Circuit has not yet scheduled oral argument.