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		ff(s),	No. 25-00766 JEB		
4	V .		Washington, D.C.		
5	DONALD J. TRUMP, et al	• ,	washington, b.c.		
6	5 6 1		March 15, 2025		
6	Defenda	nt(s).			
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8	MOTION HEARING HELD VIA ZOOM BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES E. BOASBERG				
9		UNITED STATES DISTRICT CHIEF JUDGE			
10	APPEARANCES:				
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1 The following proceedings began at 5:00 p.m.: 2 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: We are here today for a motion 3 hearing in Civil Action 25-766, JGG, et al. versus President 4 Donald Trump, et al. 5 Beginning with counsel for the plaintiff, please 6 state your name for the record. 7 MR. GELERNT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 8 Gelernt for the plaintiffs from the ACLU. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 9 10 MR. GALINDO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Daniel 11 Galindo for the plaintiffs from the ACLU. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 1.3 MS. PERRYMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 14 Perryman for the plaintiffs from Democracy Forward Foundation. 15 16 THE COURT: Welcome. 17 MR. TRIVEDI: Somil Trivedi from the Democracy 18 Forward Foundation for the plaintiffs. 19 THE COURT: Thank you. 20 MS. RICH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Sarah Rich 2.1 for the plaintiffs, also from Democracy Forward Foundation. 2.2. THE COURT: Thank you. Nice to see all of you. 23 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Okay. And defense? 24 MR. ENSIGN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Drew Ensign 25 for the federal defendants.

THE COURT: Thanks, Mr. Ensign.

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Okay. So first, apologies for my attire. I went away for the weekend and brought with me neither a robe nor tie nor appropriate shirt, so thank you all for being appropriately attired and hope you will forgive my casual ones.

Thanks also for everybody's availability on such short notice. Again, I only learned of this case first thing this morning, and I know everybody has been working hard to get up to speed on it since that time.

So I have a few -- just a couple preliminary points and questions, and then we will move forward.

So the first is I was told first thing this morning that at least one of the named plaintiffs was at that point being placed on a plane or imminently being placed on a plane to be deported, and my ruling this morning was, because I was not aware of the issuance of any proclamation and I don't think one had been issued at the time I ruled, my ruling was based on my belief that under the INA, there was no authority to immediately deport folks who were named plaintiffs.

So my ruling was not a preventive ruling related to the AEA because I didn't believe it had been -- there had been a proclamation at that time. I now see that there has been a proclamation issued.

Mr. Ensign, do you have a time of day that that was issued you can put on the record?

MR. ENSIGN: I do not, Your Honor. We are happy to look into that and get back to you. I know it was just put on the presidential website about an hour ago.

THE COURT: But fair to say this afternoon?

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, I don't know the answer to that question.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. GELERNT: Your Honor, I apologize for interrupting. This is Mr. Gelernt. My understanding from the proclamation is that it was signed yesterday. It may not have been made public until today, but that it was signed and, I guess, kept secret until today.

THE COURT: It's an interesting question of when it is effective if it's not published. Thank you for that.

But just making clear that my ruling was INA-based this morning.

Okay. The second question which I think the plaintiffs have raised in alerting my chambers to the proclamation is that they expected planes to be departing within the last couple of hours.

And so I will ask you, Mr. Ensign, if any of the named plaintiffs are, in fact, on any plane that has departed?

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, I don't know specifically as to particular planes, but we have confirmed with the clients that these five plaintiffs that are named, the individual named plaintiffs that are a subject of the TRO, will not be removed during the course of that 14 days.

THE COURT: Okay. But then I would assume that means that they are either not on the planes or that they will not be removed from the planes and will be brought back once the planes land in El Salvador. Is that fair?

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, I don't know the status of the planes. If there are removal flights, the five would not be on them.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. Was it not six, Mr. Gelernt?

MR. GELERNT: It was five, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sorry. Okay. All right. So thank you, Mr. Ensign.

And I also understand just from looking at the docket that the government has appealed my TRO ruling. And that's obviously your right, Mr. Ensign. So I won't go into, because I don't think I have jurisdiction given the appeal, to reargue the TRO ruling, but what we will just look at today is the class question. And then if I do, in fact, certify provisionally, then we can talk.

I think what that would likely mean is that the

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plaintiffs could then seek a TRO on behalf of a certified class, and then we can talk about how we want to go from there. I think we are having an echo.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: It is. I am having difficulty with the public line. It may be too many people on here.

I'll keep it as long as I can, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

So let me ask the government then what your position is regarding the class issue only.

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, we oppose class certification. The principal reason is one of venue and authority. Under -- I think we are getting the echo again.

THE COURT: We are, but let's try to go ahead, and as annoying as it is, let's see if we can push through with the echo.

MR. ENSIGN: Thank you, Your Honor. Will do.

These are claims that plaintiffs have brought that fundamentally sound in habeas. When the supreme court considered the last AEA case in Ludecke versus Watkins, 355 U.S. 160, these were all considered within the scope of habeas. And because this is a habeas case, because it sounds in habeas and because plaintiffs have specifically included a habeas claim, I believe it's Count 9 of their complaint, then the venue rules of habeas apply.

Under the supreme court decision in Rumsfeld v.

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Padilla, venue was only appropriate for a habeas case solely in the location where the person is being detained or where (unintelligible), and so because of that --

(There was an interruption by the court reporter.)

THE COURT: Sorry, Tammy, the court reporter.

I think when there's an echo, I think you might have to sort of proceed sentence by sentence and pause and let the echo go through and then continue.

And, Tammy, we'll hope that will be satisfactory.

So, Mr. Ensign, again, the issue is venue. You are saying that it must be brought where the warden or the -- typically prisoner cases, it's the warden, but here, whoever is actually detaining the plaintiffs. Is that correct?

MR. ENSIGN: That's correct, Your Honor. In addition, this Court has recognized, and I believe Your Honor in the Vetre versus Sessions case, which is 316 F. Supp. 70, that when habeas is available, then that is an -- that's an adequate alternative remedy that precludes APA claims under Section 702, and so all the claims would have to be considered under habeas.

And because of that, you know, to the extent that there could ever be a class, it could only be solely within a single judicial district of people there. And of course, it would still have to satisfy all the other requirements of classes, but certainly that venue issue precludes this Court

certifying a nationwide class.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.

MR. GELERNT: Sure, Your Honor. I think initially --

Mr. Gelernt, can you respond to the venue question?

I guess I don't have an echo, so I can continue.

Initially we have -- we think this conflates the merits. And you know, you issued a TRO. You found you had jurisdiction to issue a TRO. So we think that's sufficient at this point. I think we are veering pretty far into the merits.

But just taking it on those terms, for one thing, we filed both a habeas and APA 1331. And you can challenge the Enemy Aliens Act without habeas. There are cases like Clark that do that. But also, for habeas, I would also say that the immediate custodian rule does not apply because this is not core habeas asking for relief. It's to stop the transfer and challenge the constitutionality.

So both because we haven non-habeas fonds of jurisdiction and because the immediate custodian rule doesn't immediately apply in this case, I think that's more than sufficient for this Court to proceed.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Ensign, Mr. Gelernt is right that they are not seeking release, so tell me why you think your venue argument is still appropriate.

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, because these claims

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inherently sound in habeas. Plaintiffs recognize that themselves by bringing a habeas case. The supreme court itself has recognized that it's appropriate to consider this in habeas when it did so in the Ludecke case.

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And where habeas applies, it displaces a lot of other law including specifically the APA, as this court found in the Vetre case. It also displaces even statutory causes of action. You know, Heck v. Humphrey, for example, even though you would otherwise have a 1983 suit for most constitutional claims, the second they sound in habeas, habeas, you know, cuts off 1983 entirely and forces you to go through the route of habeas.

And so the habeas rule has some real teeth and is ultimately an attack on the authority of wardens to turn people over, you know, to be removed, and they would -- I mean, what they are seeking ultimately is the equivalent to telling the immigration, equivalent to a warden, you may not release these people to be removed from the country.

THE COURT: Isn't that the exact opposite of habeas where you just said you are ordering them you may not be released as opposed to habeas which is you must be released, right?

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, it is -- in this application, it is a little odd, but certainly the way the supreme court has considered it previously, like,

specifically challenges to the AEA sounded in habeas. And that was an utterly uncontroversial aspect of the Ludecke decision. Even though it was five-four about, you know, the intricacies of the AEA, it nonetheless was uncontroversial there that this was properly heard as a habeas claim.

THE COURT: Do you want to respond to that,
Mr. Gelernt?

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MR. GELERNT: Your Honor, I would just say that the fact that some cases can be brought in habeas certainly doesn't preclude them being brought under 1331 and the APA and this court. And Your Honor has opinions along those lines with detainees outside of the district in Damus and I think Heredia Mons as well.

As Your Honor said, this is not a core habeas. We certainly can proceed in habeas in this district, but we don't need to proceed in habeas. We are not aware of any case that says we cannot challenge the Alien Enemies Act on non-habeas grounds.

THE COURT: All right. Well, this is obviously an issue that has not been briefed.

I should have said earlier at the beginning of the hearing, although it is implicit, that there is no broadcasting or recording of this hearing, and I am being informed that it is, in fact, being broadcast by a certain individual. That's in violation of the court's rules. That

can be punishable by contempt. You may not broadcast or record any court proceedings. And further -- I am getting further information we will shut down the public line.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, I did make that statement.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: You're welcome.

THE COURT: So I think it would be very helpful for me to get some expedited briefing on this. And I know that given the circumstances, the plaintiffs are justifiably concerned about imminent deportation.

Can you tell us, Mr. Ensign, are imminent deportations and removals under this proclamation planned? When I say imminent, I mean in the next 24 or 48 hours.

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, I don't know the answer to that question. We can certainly investigate that and report that back to you. But I don't know that — the answer to that. I know what plaintiffs have said to the clerk's office. I don't yet know — have an ability to confirm that or, you know, contest that.

THE COURT: Okay. So how soon can you get that information?

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, I can certainly talk to them ASAP and see. You know, it is Saturday. I will try to get people as quickly as possible and find out that information.

You know, I think we were certainly planning on opposing the TRO by tomorrow night in advance of the hearing on Monday if that's still going forward. We can certainly include it in that filing if that works.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Gelernt, do you want to propose a schedule for me? I think I would like the -- we should probably have the government first respond saying there is -- arguing just on the venue issue of class certification, and then you can respond to that and I would rule quickly.

MR. GELERNT: Your Honor, a couple of things. One is that I recognize it's Saturday, but on the other hand, the government appears to be moving planes very rapidly to El Salvador with hundreds of people. So we hope that in the next five minutes, counsel for the government can get an answer to that.

Our understanding from people on the ground, from different sources, is that planes are going right now taking Venezuelans to El Salvador and may be ending up in a Salvadoran prison. Not only will that divest this Court of jurisdiction, but I think those people are in real trouble, Venezuelans put into a Salvadoran prison.

So we had two flights that we believe were scheduled for this afternoon that may have already taken off or during this hearing, so I think in the next five minutes.

And we would further ask Your Honor that you issue a class-wide TRO pending the briefing, and we will be prepared to get the venue briefing in as soon as the government can do it and you would like. But I think there is so much urgency here and there is so much harm at stake and this Court's jurisdiction is at stake.

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And just one clarification, Your Honor, we don't believe we would need to amend the TRO because the TRO did ask for a class-wide TRO. The complaint was a class complaint. We have class papers, and the TRO was seeking a class TRO.

So we would respectfully urge this Court to issue a class TRO now to avoid any more harm and then brief the venue as fast as the government would like. And we would respond in eight hours or so or ten hours or whatever the Court thinks is appropriate.

THE COURT: I think it would probably be helpful if we adjourned this hearing briefly and let Mr. Ensign do some digging and then returned and talked about this further. So why don't we -- can we adjourn this hearing until 6:00 Eastern Time, at which time, Mr. Ensign, I will want to know, have planes, in fact -- is deportation of people under the proclamation pursuant to the AEA in motion now and will it be for the next 48 hours, because that would require a more immediate decision. All right, Mr. Ensign?

We can do that, Your Honor. 1 MR. ENSIGN: 2 briefly on the irreparable harm point, as the supreme court 3 said in Nken, Although removal is a serious burden for many aliens, it's not categorically irreparable as some courts 4 5 have said. It is accordingly plain that the burden of 6 removal alone cannot constitute the requisite irreparable 7 injury. 8 I think they have made out more than just 9 I think they have made out the harm that will 10 befall the individual plaintiffs upon removal. 11 So what we will do is we will adjourn the hearing 12 until 6:00 p.m. Eastern Time. We will resume the hearing at 1.3 that point and get information from Mr. Ensign, and then I 14 will also try to have a better sense of whether I am 15 prepared to -- again, it could be issuing a separate TRO 16 covering this provisional class or not. 17 Okay. Any objection to that, Mr. Gelernt? 18 MR. GELERNT: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 19 THE COURT: Good. 20 Mr. Ensign? 2.1 MR. ENSIGN: No, Your Honor. We will proceed as you 2.2. instruct. 23 THE COURT: Okay. See everybody in 38 minutes. 24 Thanks.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: This honorable court is

adjourned until 6:00 p.m. 1 2 (The hearing adjourned at 5:22 p.m.) 3 THE COURT: Thanks, Nikki. Welcome back, everybody. I don't think we need to 4 5 have everyone identify themselves again. I've got the same 6 counsel present. 7 Mr. Ensign, let's hear your report. 8 MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, unfortunately I don't have 9 many details to share. I have talked to the clients who let 10 me know the sort of operational details as to what is going 11 on with raised potential national security issues, 12 particularly ones if discussed with a public line. So I do 1.3 not have additional details I can provide at this time. 14 They raised that we may be able to provide Your Honor 15 additional details in an in camera hearing if we were to --16 THE COURT: Fine. Maybe what we should do -- Nikki, 17 can we either disconnect the public line, or can you put us 18 in breakout rooms? Can we disconnect and then reconnect the 19 public line, or can we go into a breakout room? 20 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: I can just remove the public 2.1 line right now. 2.2. THE COURT: And then can you reinstate it? 23 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: I believe so. If it. 24 disconnects, I can call it without interrupting as well. 25 It's different than the courtroom.

1 THE COURT: Okay. So we are going to disconnect the 2 public line for this in camera proceeding, and then we will 3 come back. 4 (The public line was disconnected.) 5 THE COURT: Okay. The public line is disconnected. 6 Mr. Ensign. 7 MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, I am still trying to get 8 additional details. I don't -- we would have to sort out 9 what can still be provided in camera. They suggested that 10 as a way to potentially provide some details, but I do not 11 personally have those right now. 12 THE COURT: So you have no details for us in camera? 1.3 MR. ENSIGN: Not at this time, Your Honor. We would 14 have to figure out what could be provided in camera. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Well, when is that going to be 16 determined? MR. ENSIGN: 17 I don't know. I have been trying to get 18 those details, and I don't presently know when I would be 19 able to get that. I'm certainly trying to get that 20 information, but that is not something, the details, that I 2.1 know. 2.2. MR. GELERNT: Your Honor, I'm sorry. 23 THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 24 MR. GELERNT: Your Honor, what we understand is that 25 two flights went to El Salvador this afternoon, one very

1 recently, and there's another one, we are not sure where 2 it's scheduled to go exactly. It may be Honduras. We are 3 not sure. But it's supposed to leave at 6:23. 4 THE COURT: All right. Let's reconnect the public 5 line. 6 THE COURT REPORTER: Your Honor, is the in camera 7 portion of the hearing under seal? 8 THE COURT: I trust not, Mr. Ensign, since we didn't 9 hear anything. Any reason we need to put that under seal, 10 Mr. Ensign? 11 MR. ENSIGN: No objection, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Okay. So no, Tammy. 1.3 (The public line was reconnected.) 14 THE COURT: All right. It looks like it's -- is it 15 back up, Nikki? 16 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. So for the public, there were no 18 representations that were able to be made in our private 19 session, so the public has not missed anything. 20 All right. So, Mr. Gelernt, why don't you just 2.1 repeat your statement. 2.2. MR. GELERNT: We understand that two flights went to 23 El Salvador this afternoon; one very recently, and then 24 another flight is scheduled for 6:23, we believe, to 25 Honduras, but we are not entirely sure. And the flight

destinations have changed for these past two flights. But we believe it's scheduled for 6:23, so only in a matter of minutes.

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THE COURT: So, Mr. Ensign, you can't -- can you confirm that people -- you can't even confirm -- well, I guess on the public line, you're not -- and actually couldn't make any representations even privately what's happening with any flights.

So let me just go over then a few issues that we discussed earlier. So the first is the people who would be subject to be certified as a class and then further requested TRO, Mr. Gelernt, they are, as you believe, all currently held under INA?

MR. GELERNT: They are all in proceedings as far as we understand, and so what the government apparently is doing is using the Alien Enemies Act to circumvent the immigration laws and to remove them before they actually have a final order. That's the case with the five plaintiffs, and that's what we understand to be happening around the country.

THE COURT: Right, but what I'm trying to look at is the venue and habeas question.

MR. GELERNT: Right.

THE COURT: And so I guess -- it seems that you are not seeking to challenge the fact or duration of their

confinement. Is that true?

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MR. GELERNT: That's absolutely right, Your Honor.

And I think that's the critical distinction here, that it's not a core habeas challenging release. They are not trying to get out of detention in this lawsuit. They are going to be held in detention presumably unless they have some individual basis under the INA to get out. This lawsuit will not allow them to be released, but it will stop their removal hopefully under the Alien Enemies Act so they can continue their proceedings under the immigration law. So it's absolutely not a core habeas.

THE COURT: So --

MR. GELERNT: I apologize, Your Honor. I was just going to add the point --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. GELERNT: -- even if it could be brought in habeas, that doesn't mean it has to be. So your decision in RILR makes that point, Araceli. There's a number of cases in this district. You made the point very clearly in your IRLR decision that even if it could be brought in habeas, it doesn't have to be.

THE COURT: Mr. Ensign, why do you think then that they are challenging the fact or duration of confinement?

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, I think that this sounds in habeas for several reasons. I think one is that because the

AEA vests all its authority, relevant authority, with the president himself and the APA can't be used to challenge presidential actions, the only claims that we are left with here are habeas claims.

We think the supreme court's decision in the 1948

we think the supreme court's decision in the 1948 case in Ludecke also indicates that this is a habeas case. And it's ultimately challenging, you know, the exercise of the authority over their person under the AEA in a way that has been recognized to sound in habeas previously.

But on top of all those things, we think that even if wasn't core habeas, it would still be subject to the habeas rule. Notably this court in the Vetre case --

THE COURT: You keep saying this court, and I don't think you mean me. Do you?

MR. ENSIGN: I actually do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So the 316 F. Supp. 70?

MR. ENSIGN: Yes. 316 F. Supp. 3d.

THE COURT: Right. So I'm saying that F. Supp. predates my time here. Okay. Sorry. Go ahead.

MR. ENSIGN: I apologize, Your Honor. Of course when I mean the court, I mean the district for the District of Columbia.

THE COURT: Right, which I'm not bound by. So if you will distinguish, I try to do that in my opinions, if you would be so kind.

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MR. ENSIGN: Absolutely, Your Honor. In the Vetre case, there were non-core habeas claims including conditions. And in that case, this court recognized, this was in a somewhat odd posture, that within DDC, that because prison condition cases could be brought in habeas, they had to be. And so similarly, because these claims can be

brought in habeas, they have to be.

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THE COURT: The prison condition cases, again, relate to the nature of confinement and duration of your confinement. And here, they are not arguing that they can't be confined. They are just saying they can't be removed, right?

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, we are using it to address whether this is core or non-core. In Vetre, a non-core habeas claim was transferred under the venue rule. So whether this is core habeas, as we have argued, and clearly where the venue rule would apply or even if this were non-core habeas, then nonetheless the venue rule still applies to it as this court has recognized.

MR. GELERNT: Your Honor, I would just say that that case involved, I think you were getting at this, but the length of someone's confinement.

THE COURT: Again, I have not gone back and reviewed that case because your citation earlier, Mr. Ensign, led me to believe it was not my case. I know IRLR is.

I guess your -- do you want to dismiss your habeas claim, Mr. Gelernt? I don't know. It's certainly not your primary claim. You may have other reasons for including it.

MR. GELERNT: Your Honor, I think if the Court felt like it needed us to dismiss the habeas in order to issue a class-wide TRO, then we are prepared to do that. We certainly don't feel like we need it.

On the other hand, I think the Court could just hold it in abeyance. I mean, I think that it's very clear that if you don't need to bring it in habeas, you don't have to and you can bring it — in other words, I think Your Honor could not have been clearer in IRLR. There are a number of cases that say that. Otherwise, virtually every case would be brought in habeas.

THE COURT: Again, I think this is a reasonably close question, but I've got to rule on it with essentially 40 minutes' notice given that this was first raised by the government in our hearing. And I'm not blaming the government at all because they haven't had an opportunity to brief it.

And so as brief as my research has been at this period of time, I don't think that venue bars certification. I will, for clarity, I will grant the plaintiffs' -- first grant the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss their habeas count. So that count is dismissed without prejudice at this point.

But I do find that class certification is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2). So I will certify a class, and the class will be -- let's talk about the definition. The plaintiffs ask for all noncitizens who were, are, or will be subject to the AEA proclamation and its implementation.

So now that we actually have a proclamation that we have been able to review, Mr. Gelernt, is there a reason to modify that class definition?

MR. GELERNT: I think certainly, Your Honor, if you want to insert the name of the proclamation and the date, that would be fine with us, or we could submit it to the Court. But I think, if I'm understanding you correctly, I think that's what you are getting at, and that would make sense.

THE COURT: Or if there's other -- that's one point, but whether there's another modification that you would make.

MR. GELERNT: Yeah.

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THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. GELERNT: I think the other point would be that it seems to be the government's position that they can begin these removals pursuant to the act without publicizing and publicize after the removals have started. So that makes us very concerned that there could be another proclamation

1 coming tomorrow naming a different gang, MS-13 or some other 2 gang. 3 So I guess we could start with this one if Your Honor 4 would like to proceed more slowly, but there may be a 5 modification that could say any proclamation that names a 6 non-state actor. 7 THE COURT: Yeah, I'm just -- I appreciate that. 8 feel that that's going farther than I would be prepared to 9 go as to deal with a hypothetical --10 MR. GELERNT: Right. 11 THE COURT: -- proclamation. 12 MR. GELERNT: Understood. 1.3 THE COURT: So let me ask you, Mr. Ensign. I know 14 you are objecting to the certification of the class, and 15 this is a provisional certification only, but do you have 16 concerns, if certified, with the wording, and would you 17 propose amendments to that? 18 MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, first, just for the record, 19 we do object to the class certification, as you know. 20 trying to pull up the specific language right now. 2.1 Candidly, it's not a question I have given thought to 2.2. before. 23 THE COURT: No, I understand. I understand. 24 Everybody here is operating on the fly a bit. I can tell

you what the -- I think I wrote the -- the language I wrote

down earlier was all noncitizens who were, are, or will be subject to the AEA proclamation.

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I mean, I think -- I don't know why -- Mr. Gelernt, is there a reason we can't simply say all noncitizens who are subject to the proclamation?

MR. GELERNT: I would prefer that we have will be, but I understand if Your Honor thinks that are covers the waterfront.

THE COURT: I think so. So the language would be all noncitizens who are subject to the AEA proclamation, and we will get the specifics, and its implementation.

MR. GELERNT: And so I assume, Your Honor, that would mean that anybody who is designated a week from now, I mean, will be would cover it obviously, assuming it's going to continue designating people, so I assume that's why it is in there.

THE COURT: Yes. Well, when you say designated, you mean for removal?

MR. GELERNT: Well, I think they have to say you are designated. I gather what the government is doing is designating you as someone subject to the Alien Enemies Act, and then they can do whatever they want to them, detain them, remove them. And so that's why the will is in there. But if Your Honor is stating on the record that are would cover anybody who in the future is subject to it —

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Yes.

MR. GELERNT: Okay.

THE COURT: Now or in the future is.

MR. GELERNT: Right.

THE COURT: So back to you, Mr. Ensign. Any modification of that?

MR. ENSIGN: No, Your Honor. I mean, no, Your Honor. We don't believe we have a basis to dictate to plaintiffs how they would, you know, define their own class.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ENSIGN: But as to the substitution of, you know, the specific proclamation at issue, to make it specific to that, that we don't have objection specifically to that. I would preserve, you know, our objections to -- we focused on venue, but we don't believe the other requirements of class certification have been met here. In particular, for typicality, there may be very different claims as to those that were lawfully admitted to the United States and those who, you know, never had lawful admission.

THE COURT: Okay. I think, again, at this provisional time, and I guess -- what we will say is APA proclamation of March 15, 2025, and we can actually use the specific title which I see based on the text of that.

Okay. So plaintiffs then are also seeking a TRO related to that class. And again, so -- I'll just say a few things here, that this is obviously a difficult question.

My ruling earlier related to the INA. This is difficult for a few reasons. And again, I'm just looking at the likelihood of success on the merits. And under our circuit, the question is is there a serious legal question presented, not is there necessarily a 51 percent chance of prevailing.

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And there are really sort of two issues on this. The first is does the political question doctrine or other -- or do other prudential considerations bar judicial scrutiny of the proclamation in the first place, and second, if they do not bar such scrutiny, is the proclamation illegal.

I think that the first question is harder than the second. And again, we have tried to do quick research on a very expedited time frame, and I'm well aware of the president's broad authority to apprehend, restrain, and remove noncitizens deemed alien enemies.

For example, the president has unreviewable authority to determine whether a state of war actually exists, and if so, to remove enemy aliens in the manner he wishes.

So the question is does such authority extend to other determinations within the statute such as invasion or predatory incursion or foreign nation or government. And that, unfortunately, is a question of first impression here.

We certainly looked at some of the cases like Ludecke, L-U-D-E-C-K-E, the 1948 supreme court case, in

addition to Lockington versus Smith from the hoary vintage of 1817, as well as Clark, which is the D.C. Circuit case from 1946, and Von Heyman, H-E-Y-M-A-N, Second Circuit, 1947.

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These are difficult questions. There's also a helpful law review by Professor Vladeck, V-L-A-D-E-C-K, from 2007 in the Lewis & Clark Law Review about enemy aliens, enemy property, and access to courts which sets some of these points out as well.

So I guess, Mr. Ensign, maybe you are prepared to deal with this and maybe you are not yet, but tell me why, given the lack of authority regarding the president's — whether the president's authority extends to his determination of some of those other terms, I should hold that it does.

Again, I know this was going to be a class cert hearing and we are all racing to get up to speed on this, but I will be happy to hear you if you want to discuss that.

MR. ENSIGN: Sure, Your Honor. As you know, there isn't a lot of precedent on this, but what there is, you know, recognizes the quite broad discretion of the president here.

In particular, the Ludecke case arose from a circumstance where a German plaintiff, you know, was still being held under the AEA, who had a facially quite

reasonable claim, you know, that the war has ended, the war has been over for three years, what are you doing still, you know, exercising AEA authority over me.

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And the court said quite clearly, like, no, this is left to the discretion of the president, and the president has determined that the war is continuing notwithstanding the fact that they are not -- you know, there is not fighting going on and that, in fact, the E-day was, I believe, more than three years in the rearview mirror at that point.

And so certainly when the supreme court reached this, it recognized the very broad discretion of the president.

There's other language in that case towards the tail end of it that I unfortunately don't have at my fingertips but again underscores the extent to which discretion is vested in the president as to these sorts of questions.

THE COURT: Right. But isn't -- and again, read broadly, Ludecke certainly supports you, and certainly even read narrowly, I understand the courts can't question the president's power to remove enemy aliens or even his determination that a state of war continues to exist, but it did seem to accept that courts could hear challenges to the construction and validity of the statute and in that case challenges raising whether the person restrained is, in fact, an enemy alien 14 years of age or older. That's at

page 171, footnote 17.

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So read more narrowly, why doesn't it leave open the question that judicial review is available to look at whether certain preconditions have been met for the president to invoke the statute?

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, I think the nature of the claims here are ones that are more of the sort that are the political questions. For example, plaintiffs are very much advancing the concept that, you know, war is not something that can be engaged in or, you know, is a concept that has relevance as to subnational actors. I think that is a question that has been reserved for the political branches.

In particular, for example, the Congress in 2001 gave the president authorization of war powers to use against subnational actors such as Al-Qaeda. Here, we have TDA has specifically been designated as a foreign terrorist organization. So you have a recognition that the war powers do extend to this sort of context as to which plaintiffs are advancing a claim.

And so I think that sort of claim that plaintiffs are raising here sounds in that sort of core political question that has been reserved for the political branches.

THE COURT: Mr. Gelernt, do you want to respond to that?

MR. GELERNT: I think Your Honor made the point that

I was going to make. I mean, this is ultimately a separation of powers question. What was going on in Ludecke was whether the war was over, and it was a declared war by Congress, and Congress has not stated that the war was over. I think that's what the supreme court was ultimately saying.

I don't read Ludecke as saying that the preconditions, the statutory preconditions, can't be challenged; otherwise, there would be no end to what the executive branch could do. This is a delegation from Congress. There are very specific terms. And we read Ludecke as saying that the construction of the statute can be challenged and whether someone fits within the proclamation can be challenged. I think Ludecke was ultimately, again, about separation of powers.

THE COURT: And then it would seem that Clark and

Von Heyman are better cases for you even though they are -they precede Ludecke, Mr. Gelernt. Do you agree with that?

MR. GELERNT: Your Honor, I don't want to get ahead of myself. I have not looked back on those cases before this hearing.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. GELERNT: I think there are certainly additional cases. I was simply responding to Ludecke. But I think there are many other cases that allow -- that challenge the statutory preconditions. I think that's, you know, sort of

fundamental separation of powers law. This is not sort of the president invoking his inherent authority under the constitution. We don't think that he would have the power to do it anyway. But this is the president invoking a specific statutory provision that Congress has laid out very clear guidelines, and I think it would be fundamentally inconsistent with separation of powers for this Court not to be able to review whether those preconditions were met.

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THE COURT: Let me ask you, in looking at the language of the proclamation, why on the merits, if I got to it and found it's not a political question, why don't you think, Mr. Gelernt, that the proclamation suffices to say that TDA is part of the Venezuelan government that is involved in an invasion or predatory incursion?

MR. GELERNT: Well, Your Honor, I think the government -- I think the proclamation doesn't even go as far as actually stating that TDA is a foreign government.

And the language is pretty clear in the statute that you need a foreign government. As Your Honor knows, the statute has only been invoked three times in the history of the country and always during a declared war, the War of --

THE COURT: Let me interrupt. So it says that, and

I'm reading from the proclamation, Venezuelan national and

local authorities have ceded ever greater control over their

territories to transnational criminal organizations

including TDA. The result is a hybrid criminal state that is perpetrating an invasion of and predatory incursion into the United States.

So why don't you think that's a foreign nation?

MR. GELERNT: Well, I think there's a lot of law, and we will be prepared to reply to the government's submission at the TRO and talk more about it at the TRO on the merits, but I think there is a lot of law about what constitutes a foreign government. And I don't think the United States recognizes TDA as a foreign government. They recognize Venezuela as a foreign government. I think that's the historic understanding of the statute.

We also would take issue with the fact that we think the Court certainly can review whether immigration constitutes some kind of invasion. You know, it may be that the Court can't second-guess how much of an invasion a foreign government is making, that that may be a matter of degree, but certainly that sort of threshold legal question about whether immigration constitutes an invasion is something the Court can rule on. And we know of no historical precedent that would suggest that straight migration or noncitizens coming and committing crimes constitutes an invasion within the meaning of the statute or the constitution.

THE COURT: Mr. Ensign, do you want to respond to

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that?

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MR. ENSIGN: Certainly. A few things, Your Honor. I think first, they are trying to draw a distinction between the statutory preconditions at issue here from Ludecke, but it was statutory preconditions in both cases. Whether or not there's, in fact, a war was very much the issue in Ludecke. That is one of the statutory conditions. They are challenging others. But it's — they are all part of the same statutory preconditions, you know, framework, are they met or not. And the Court just straight up deferred to the president in circumstances where a lot of people would think there was not a war.

I guess two other things I would say. One is that this -- I think this discussion very much illustrates why additional briefing would be desirable to resolve this.

THE COURT: No, no, absolutely. I couldn't agree with you more. But the question is what do we do in the interim, right? No, I want further briefing from both sides. I want to look at this longer. This is not easy. These are not easy issues. And I appreciate everyone's diligence on such short notice. But the question in a case like this is why shouldn't a TRO issue to maintain the status quo on difficult issues while you folks figure it out.

In other words, maybe there's some national security

or other concerns that you have that you haven't raised yet because you haven't learned of them yet that you could tell me and I would hear, but right now it seems that the status quo is keeping these folks in ICE custody but not deporting them. And I'm not sure what the prejudice to the government is from such a determination.

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I mean, tell me if I'm -- to the extent you can say anything that's not national security to respond to that.

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, I think two responses. The first is that much of plaintiffs' irreparable harm arguments were predicated on the premise that this Court would somehow lose jurisdiction if people were not — I mean, not in D.C., but in the United States. I think that was more a question of habeas. Now that we are past habeas and we are really just talking about APA, I don't understand why this Court would necessarily lose jurisdiction.

THE COURT: If they are deported?

MR. ENSIGN: And I think second is how Nken looks at it as irreparable harm where --

THE COURT: I think the argument — the argument, excuse me for interrupting and I will let you respond, but the argument in part is these folks are going to be sent to Salvadoran or Honduran prisons, which were not going to be terribly receptive to Venezuelans, particularly whom you have labeled TDA, and so not only are they going to be

deported, but it's not going to be to a friendly countryside, but to prisons. So why isn't -- don't you think that's irreparable?

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, I don't think that's been established by their filings. More generally, I would just point out that this cuts to the core of the president's Article II powers. And so interfering with that, you know, both in the -- both in the -- this goes to foreign powers -- or foreign policy. This goes to war powers. This goes to immigration. These are core Article III -- or sorry, Article II areas that -- I mean, this would cut very deeply into the prerogatives of the executive, and for that basis, we think the balance of harms are tipped sharply in our direction.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Gelernt, do you want to respond to the irreparable harm issue?

MR. GELERNT: Yes, Your Honor, a few things. One is I think the Court would lose jurisdiction because it wouldn't be able to offer a remedy.

THE COURT: Right. Sure. I mean, once they are out of the country, I'm not sure what I can do there.

MR. GELERNT: Right. So you clearly would lose jurisdiction. I think that alone is critical.

The other point is that this is just not straight removal, as Your Honor has pointed out. They may be sent to

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El Salvador. It seems like many of them already have been sent to El Salvador. They are in real danger, I can't express that strongly enough, if they end up in a Salvadoran prison. But even if they end up back in Venezuela, many of them, all of our plaintiffs and many of them, will have asylum claims, and they have been tagged now as the worst of the worst by the president, and so they will be in real danger in Venezuela.

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Now, ultimately some of them may lose their asylum claims in the U.S., but they are entitled, we believe, to finishing that, and the Aliens Enemy Act can't circumvent that point.

And the government keeps bringing up the Nken case.

Nken was very clear that the court was not going to lose jurisdiction in that petition for review, that particular petition for review, but also that if there was harm like torture or persecution, then that would be irreparable harm. The court was just making the simple point that not every deportation involves irreparable harm. They could be removed to the UK, and there may not be irreparable harm.

So I think this goes far beyond the normal type of irreparable harm. And even in removal cases, of course, this Court often stays things while it figures it out. These are individuals who are in detention, so it's not as if they are roaming around. I think for the government to

say that the delay in doing this is irreparable --

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THE COURT: Let me ask you, Mr. Gelernt, let me just interrupt you for a second. I think there was a little bit of confusion or uncertainty in your response earlier on this point. Is it fair that — I think you equivocated a little bit, and I'm not saying that in a negative way, on whether all of the potential class was actually held by — was actually currently in custody in the United States. Do you know the answer to that?

MR. GELERNT: We believe that everyone right now who is going to be put on flights is in custody. I don't know that the proclamation limits it to that, but I think --

THE COURT: So let me ask you. So what if the class were narrowed to all noncitizens in United States custody?

MR. GELERNT: Right. I think two points about that.

One is that would solve the immediate problem of them being put on planes, because if they are not in detention, they can't be put on planes.

But the other point, I think, in terms of irreparable harm is obviously the government remains free to arrest them if they've committed an immigration violation or a criminal violation and put them in detention. And as Your Honor pointed out earlier, we are not seeking their release from U.S. facilities. So we are not in any way saying that the government needs to allow them to continue roaming the

streets. But if Your Honor feels like at this stage issuing a TRO for the class of individuals who are currently in detention or will be imminently put in detention, I think that would work given that we are all moving very quickly and I know Your Honor is trying to figure this out on the fly.

THE COURT: So back to you, Mr. Ensign. In terms of -- so harm to the United States by a TRO of short duration regarding only people who are already in detention so they can't cause any harm within the United States and enjoin their removal from the United States, what's the harm to the government by such a status quo TRO?

MR. ENSIGN: I mean, I think it cuts to the core of the president's authority over critical areas that have been assigned to them, that war powers, immigration, you know, conducting foreign policy, like, those are harms of, you know, significant sorts.

This is where you have an express statutory authorization, so this is a Youngstown Steel, you know, category 1 type case in our perspective. So we certainly think there are very substantial harms.

I mean, you know, certainly we object to any TRO.

Our preference would obviously be a narrower one if there is one, but we believe that any TRO impermissibly and unconstitutionally infringes upon the prerogatives of the

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president, no more so here than it would have been for the
supreme court in Ludecke to tell the president, you know
what, you're wrong, World War II is over.

THE COURT: Right. And that sort of is the
justiciability argument, not the balance of the equities
argument, right?

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MR. ENSIGN: No, Your Honor. I think it sounds in both. Certainly you see it more frequently in that context, and usually where it applies, you will never get to irreparable harm because it's not justiciable. But those sorts of harms to the executive have been recognized, you know, certainly as to anything that enjoins an act of Congress. Maryland versus King recognizes that's irreparable harm.

The same principle applies to, you know, the injunction against the president exercising his powers both inherent in Article II and those given to him by statute such as the AEA.

THE COURT: All right. Any response to that, Mr. Gelernt?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GELERNT: No, Your Honor. I think I --

MR. GELERNT: I apologize. I just wanted two housekeeping things, but I will do that after you finish, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I am prepared to rule. Again, I think these are hard questions, close questions, and particularly hard questions on the expedited time frame that we are talking about here. But I believe that the plaintiffs have sufficiently made out and satisfied the TRO factors.

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I think the hardest remains the likelihood of success on the merits because of the justiciability question. But at this point, they have certainly presented a serious question that this is justiciable because it's outside of what Ludecke talked about, and that once it is justiciable, I think they have certainly presented a serious question that the president's proclamation is not legal under the AEA, or a different way of saying it is that the AEA does not provide a basis for the president's proclamation given that the terms invasion, predatory incursion really relate to hostile acts perpetrated by enemy nations and commensurate to war.

Also the terms nation and government do not apply to non-state actors like criminal gangs. And the statute doesn't refer in my interpretation to unauthorized presence of individuals here including individuals who have entered illegally.

And so as a result, I don't think the AEA provides a basis for removal under this proclamation.

I think on the other three factors, the plaintiffs have an easier time. I think there's clearly irreparable harm here given that these folks will be deported and many or a vast majority to prisons in other countries or even

back to Venezuela where they face persecution or worse.

Again, based on the record that I have, balance of the equities, I think is reasonably straightforward inasmuch as a brief delay in their removal does not cause the government harm, and I haven't heard any harm from the government beyond general infringement on presidential powers which, again, I don't take lightly, but I think that's more of an issue that relates to the justiciability than it does to the balance of the equities. And again, the public interest in a case like this runs with the factors I have already mentioned.

So I find that a TRO is appropriate for the class members, and it would be to prevent the removal of the class for 14 days or until further order of the Court. And the class will be all noncitizens in U.S. custody who are subject to the proclamation of March 15, 2025 and its implementation.

And I will issue a minute order memorializing this so you don't have to race to write it down.

So we need to talk about where we go from here because I want to revisit this after some more briefing.

And again, these are hard questions, and I may end up coming out the other way on some of them after I have had more time to think about them and hear from both sides. But what I am tasked to do today is to make the best ruling I can under the law and the circumstances.

And particularly given the plaintiffs' information unrebutted by the government that flights are actively departing and plan to depart, I do not believe that I am able to wait any longer and that I am required to act immediately, which I have done so.

So, Mr. Ensign, the first point is that I -- that you shall inform your clients of this immediately, and that any plane containing these folks that is going to take off or is in the air needs to be returned to the United States, but those people need to be returned to the United States.

However that's accomplished, whether turning around a plane or not embarking anyone on the plane or those people covered by this on the plane, I leave to you. But this is something that you need to make sure is complied with immediately.

We need to set briefing and hearing schedules.

Otherwise, Mr. Gelernt, did your housekeeping matters relate to those or something else?

MR. GELERNT: No, they didn't, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So do you want to raise those now?

MR. GELERNT: Oh, they were very, very small. One is

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that of the two flights I mentioned that took off this afternoon, I had said that both went to El Salvador. We are now hearing that maybe only one went to El Salvador, and one may have gone to Honduras. I just wanted to correct the record.

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THE COURT: Again, just so we are clear, if planes have already landed and discharged their occupants, aside from the five plaintiffs I enjoined earlier, then this order -- I don't have jurisdiction to require their return.

MR. GELERNT: Right. And the other thing was also very small. It's just we would just -- if Your Honor is going to use March 15 as the date, just to say that it was published on the 15th, but we do think it was a March 14 order because that's when it was signed by the president.

THE COURT: Well, I will be sure to cite the title so there won't be any confusion.

MR. GELERNT: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Ensign, I want to hear from you since you are now the party being restrained what you would like to do in terms of briefing and hearing. I had set a hearing for Monday. Given what's now happened, that's not in stone, so what would you like?

MR. ENSIGN: Your Honor, offhand, I think we would be prepared to file a brief Monday night. We could potentially do so earlier, but in particular, many of the people subject

to this order, many, most, or all of them are incredibly dangerous individuals, and so we would like to be able to develop that as appropriate to --

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THE COURT: No, given -- let me just say, as I said, you are the one being restrained, so I will give you as much time as you want because you are the one now who's being disadvantaged, so it's your motive to expedite.

MR. ENSIGN: Thank you, Your Honor. Could we tentatively set, you know, Monday night, and then we will inform the Court if we think we need additional time, and then we would ask that the plaintiffs' response be on a similarly expedited basis given that the government is now under a TRO.

THE COURT: Okay. So March 17, and that will give you until midnight for the government's opposition, and so this will be, again, to their -- I guess your brief then would be to -- I think your brief would be to vacate the TRO, which, as opposed to an opposition to their request, it should be, I think, to vacate the TRO.

And then the government can -- I'm sorry, the plaintiffs then, I will give you the same amount of time, 48 hours till the end of March -- till March 19 to oppose.

And then for a hearing, we could do Friday, the 21st. Again, because I will need time to review this myself, could we do 2:00 or 2:30 on the 21st, Mr. Gelernt? And this,

1 again, can be by Zoom. 2 MR. GELERNT: 2:30 works in person or Zoom, Your 3 Honor. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Ensign? 5 MR. ENSIGN: That should work for us, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Okay. I will say 2:30. 7 So I'm vacating the March 17 hearing. It will be 8 March 21 at 2:30. 9 Okay. So I will issue a minute order memorializing 10 all of this. And again, it will be -- Mr. Ensign, it's 11 going to be to vacate the current TRO, because the other TRO 12 is on appeal, so it won't be obviously the reason -- well, 13 the reason is somewhat different because now the 14 proclamation has been filed. But I do not have jurisdiction 15 to act on the prior TRO, so this would be for the current 16 TRO. 17 MR. ENSIGN: Understood, Your Honor. And one point 18 related to that if I might. 19 THE COURT: Sure. 20 MR. ENSIGN: Would this TRO apply to aliens that 2.1 otherwise have final orders of removal, because from our 2.2. perspective, that would be an independent basis to 23 effectuate their removal. 24 THE COURT: Right.

MR. ENSIGN: And the 1252 jurisdictional bars on this

1 Court would also apply if --2 THE COURT: Right. Yes. No, I think that that's 3 fair. 4 I would think not, Mr. Gelernt. 5 MR. GELERNT: Your Honor, if they are not removing 6 someone based on the Alien Enemies Act but based on some 7 other authority, it wouldn't fall within this jurisdiction. 8 THE COURT: Right. So yes, Mr. Ensign, I agree. 9 MR. ENSIGN: Okay. 10 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Gelernt? 11 MR. GELERNT: No, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Ensign? 1.3 MR. ENSIGN: No, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: All right. Again, thanks, everyone, for 15 your diligent work. I will issue the order, and we will see 16 you on Friday. Thank you. 17 MR. GELERNT: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 MR. ENSIGN: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 (The hearing concluded at 6:53 p.m.) 20 21 22 23 24 25

$C \ E \ R \ T \ I \ F \ I \ C \ A \ T \ E$

I hereby certify that the foregoing is an accurate transcription of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

3/16/25

s/ Tammy Nestor
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